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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
KIP ROLAND PARKIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860068 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issue is presented upon appeal: 
1. When all elements of the crimes of theft were 
either admitted or stipulated to by the appellant, except the 
element of "intent" to commit the crime, and the jury found the 
appellant not guilty of theft, may the appellant be convicted of 
"attempted theft" which requires the same "intent" as does the 
crime of "theft?" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, KIP ROLAND PARKIN, was charged by 
amended information with six counts of theft, each a 3rd degree 
felony under sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 of Utah Code 
Annotated 1913, as amended. (R 22-23) Appellant pled not guilty 
and a jury trial was held December 11th and 12th, 1985, in the 
Court of J. Harlan Burns, Fifth Judicial District in and for the 
County of Washington. The jury found appellant not guilty of 
theft, but guilty of attempted theft on each count.(R 111-116) 
On December 23, 1985, appellant filed a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.(R 121) 
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That motion was denied by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
on January 13, 1986 and appellant was sentenced on that same 
date. Appellant was sentenced to 360 days in the Washington 
County Jail, which was stayed and he was placed upon probation on 
condition he serve 90 days in the county jail, make restitution 
in the amount of $1,208.76, the value of the cattle allegedly 
stolen, and other conditions. 
Thereafter, appellant, on January 14, 1986, filed his 
Application for Certificate of Probable Cause which was denied by 
the Honorable J. Harlan Burns on January 28, 1986.(R 140) 
In lieu of filing an Application for a Certificate of 
Probable Cause with this Court, appellant filed his Notice of 
Appeal on January 30, 1986.(R-146) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, KIP ROLAND PARKIN, was living in Nephi, 
Utah, during the month of February 1985 (TR P 149, LL 16-22) when 
he made a trip to St. George, Utah on February 26, 1985 to work 
on a short term job for his employer, Jim Jones, a brick mason. 
(TR P 150, LL 4-11) 
Upon arriving, in the afternoon, in St. George, 
appellant chanced to meet one K.C. COOMBS (TR P 152, LL 21-25; P 
153, LL 1) an acquaintance since grade school from Nephi. (TR P 
151, LL 18-22) 
Coombs invited appellant to stay at his apartment while 
in St. George. (TR P 153, LL 6-10) 
Appellant checked in with his employer and arranged to 
start work the next morning. (TR P 153, LL 23-25; P 154, LL 1-8) 
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After returning to Coombs' apartment and cleaning up, 
Coombs invited appellant to ride out to Washington fields to show 
him where he had, according to Coombs, recently participated in 
motocross motorcycle races, (TR P 154, LL 16-25; P 154, LL 1) 
which they did, riding around in the area for some time. 
On the next day, after appellant had completed work for 
the day, Coombs asked him if he could borrow appellant's pick-up 
truck. (TR P 158, LL 8-13) 
Appellant first declined to let Coombs use the truck 
because it belonged to appellant's grandfather, but later felt 
guilty because Coombs had let him stay at his apartment, so 
offered to assist Coombs himself with the truck. (TR P 158, LL 
22-25; P 159, LL 1-4) 
Coombs told appellant he had promised a friend to take 
some cattle from St. George to Cedar City to a cattle auction. 
(TR P 159, LL 5-11) 
Coombs had prearranged for cattle racks for the pick-up 
from another friend (TR P 160, LL 8-14) and they then went to the 
Washington Fields area where Coombs had taken appelant the day 
before showing him where the motorcycle races had been held. 
They drove to a corral where they loaded six head of cattle into 
the truck and drove them to the auction yard in Cedar City after 
stopping in Washington, Utah, at a 7-Eleven convenience store, to 
get gasoline. (TR P 161, LL 21-25; P 162, LL 1-23) 
The cattle were unloaded at the auction yard in Cedar 
City late that night. The next day, appellant returned to the 
auction yard with Coombs in Coombs' car because his job in St. 
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George was completed, and Coombs wanted company on the ride to 
Cedar City. (TR P 164f LL 13-25; P 165, LL 1-6) 
After the cattle were sold at the auction, and the 
check given to Coombs, appellant noticed the check was made out 
to "Coombs," and he became concerned. After Coombs took the 
check to the bank and cashed it, appellant became more than 
concerned, he became suspicious. (TR P 167, LL 9-24) 
Shortly thereafter, on the way home from Cedar City, 
appellant confronted Coombs three seperate times about the check 
and was finally told by Coombs, only on the third time, that the 
cattle had actually been stolen. (TR P 167, LL 22-25; P 168, LL 
1-17) 
Coombs, before telling appellant th§t the cattle were 
stolen had given appellant $120.00 for gas and for the use of his 
truck and an additional ten dollars which he owed appellant. (TR 
P 168, LL 22-25; P 169, LL 1-16) 
The check given to Coombs at the auction yard was for 
$1,462.45. (Record exhibit list) 
Appellant denied that he had been told by Coombs prior 
to that time, or that he knew, that the cattle were in fact being 
stolen rather than transported for a friend of Coombs, as he 
insisted Coombs had told him. (TR P 160, LL 1-3; P 175, LL 21-25; 
P 176, LL 1-7; P 186, LL 20-24; P 187, LL 5-12) 
Coombs, himself, was subsequently arrested for, and 
pled guilty to, not only stealing the six head of cattle on 
February 27, 1985, the incident involving appellant, but for a 
second incident in January 1985 for a third incident in March 
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1985f and for a fourth incident in Iron County, the latter three 
incidents all unrelated to appellant, (TR P 97, LL 13-25; P 98 LL 
1-13) totalling 16 counts. (TR P 98, LL 14-25) 
Coombs, as an incident to a plea bargain, agreed to 
plead to only 4 counts of theft and to testify against appellant, 
in exchange for which, the remaining 12 counts were dismissed. 
(TR P 99, LL 7-25; P 100, LL 1-25; P 101, LL 1-5) He had not 
been sentenced at the time of the trial of appellant. 
In contradiction to the testimony of appellant, Coombs 
also testified during the trial, that he either had told 
appellant, or that he thought appellant knew, that the cattle 
were being stolen when they were being loaded into the pickup 
truck and taken to the auction yard. (TR P 77, LL 9-14 et al) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant either by stipulation or by admission during 
his testimony acknowledged or admitted all of the elements of the 
crime of theft of the cattle except the element of intent to 
steal or to unlawfully deprive the owner of the property. 
The jury found appellant not guilty of theft. Since it 
found him not guilty, in the face of the aforementioned 
stipulations and admissions, the jury could only have so found 
for the reason that it did not believe he possessed the requisit 
knowledge or intent to commit a theft, the only element to which 
he did not admit or stipulate. 
Since the offense of attempted theft, pursuant to 
§76-4-101 of the Utah Code requires that the appellant must have 
acted n. . .with the kind of culpability otherwise required for 
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the commission of the offense . • ." itself, and the jury verdict 
of not guilty of the offense of "theft" could only reflect a 
determination by the jury that appellant had not had that 
requisit intent, appellant could not be guilty of attempted theft 
either. 
ARGUMENT 
The simple issue before the Court is whether the 
appellant having admitted all elements of the crime of theft 
except intent and having been found not guilty of theft, which by 
process of elimination could only be because the jury found he 
did not have the intent to commit the crime, could he 
nevertheless be found guilty, by the jury, of attempted theft, 
which requires the same intent as is required for theft? 
I. JURY'S FAILURE TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF THEFT 
CONSTITUTES AN ACQUITAL OF THAT OFFENSE. 
The Court instructed the jury that the elements of the 
crime of theft are as follows: 
1. That the offense, if any, occurred at and within 
Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. That the offense, if any, occurred on or about the 
26th day of February, 1985, although the exact date 
is immaterial. 
3. That at said time and place the defendant, Kip 
Roland Parkin, knowingly and intentionally obtained 
and exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of another, to-wit: one heifer calf 
belonging to LeMoyne Esplin. (Each of the other 5 
counts listed a seperate animal) 
4. That the said defendant, Kip Roland Parkin, had the 
purpose and intent to permanently deprive the owner 
of such property.(R 85, 87, 89, 91, 93 & 95) 
Appellant, during his testimony, admitted, or 
stipulated to, all the Elements of #1 and #2 in their entirety. 
He also admitted all portions of Element #3 except that ". . .he 
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knowingly and intentionally obtained and exercised unauthorized 
control . . . " over the property of another. 
Appellant also denied the allegations that he had the 
purpose and intent to permanently deprive the owner of the 
property, because he thought he was assisting one K.C. Coombs 
transport the cows with the owner's knowledge and consent. 
Appellant admitted that the cows were picked up in 
Washington County, transported to Cedar City for sale at the 
auction yard, were sold and the money for the dows paid to K.C. 
Coombs by the auction yard. 
If appellant knew he, or Coombs, did not have the 
permission and consent of the owner to do those acts, he would be 
guilty of theft, nothing less! 
Nevertheless, in spite of conflicting evidence (i.e. 
the testimony of himself and the testimony of K.C. Coombs) the 
jury found him, the appellant, not guilty of theft (see verdict 
[R 111-116]) . 
The jury could only reach that verdict by a finding 
that he had not had the requisite intent. 
In Green v. United States, 355 US 184, 2 L ed 2d 199, 
78 S.Ct. 221, 61 ALR 2d 1119, the United States Supreme Court 
considered a case in which the defendant, Green had been charged 
with arson and murder. The Trial Court had given instructions on 
both first degree and second degree murder. The jury found Green 
guilty of arson and 2nd degree murder. On remand, at the end of 
a second trial, the jury this time found Green guilty of first 
degree murder. 
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The Court, however, held that the failure to convict 
the defendant Green of first degree murder, while convicting him 
of second degree murder, in the first trial constituted an 
acquital of the first degree murder charge and he could not be 
retried on the first degree murder charge because of double 
jeopardy. 
Appellant submits likewise, that in this case, the 
failure of the jury to find him guilty of theft constitutes an 
acquital of that charge, eventhough it purported to find him 
guilty of attempted theft, a lesser included offense, with which 
he had not been originally charged. 
An acquital of the charge of theft, could only occur 
because the jury failed to find the element of intent on the part 
of appellant. 
II. AN ATTEMPTED THEFT REQUIRES THE ACTOR HAVE THE 
SAME INTENT REQUIRED AS FOR THE CRIME OF THEFT 
Section 76-4-101 of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the commission of 
the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not 
constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly 
corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually 
committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the 
offense could have been committed had the 
attendant circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. (Emphasis added) 
In other words, in order to commit the crime of 
attempted theft, the appellant must have been acting with the 
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same intent that would have been required to commit the crime of 
theft. 
Obviously, the intent of the legislature is to punish 
one for attempting to commit a crime even if, because of the 
intervention of some outside force or the actor1s ineptitude, he 
is unsuccessful in completing the crime. It was clearly not the 
intent of the legislature to excise intent as an element of the 
lesser included crime of attempted theft. 
In this case, the act or acts necessary to commit a 
theft were consummated, so that only the intent of the appellant 
was left to the jury to determine. 
Respondent may argue that subsection (3)(a) of 
§76-4-101 provides that: ". . . (3) no defense,to the offense of 
attempt shall arise: (1) Because the offense was actually 
committed. . ." and therefore appellant could be guilty of an 
attempt even though not guilty of the crime itself. 
That rationale fails to take into consideration, 
however, the definition of the word offense as used in §76-4-101. 
"Offense" clearly requires a finding that intent to 
commit the offense was present. Subsection (2) of 76-4-101 the 
attempt statute provides very specifically: 
"For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute 
a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative 
of the actor's intent to commit the offense. (Emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, if there was no intent, there could be no 
crime of attempt, even if all other acts were, in fact, 
accomplished. 
The jury found there was no such intent! 
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III. ACQUITTAL OF APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF THEFT 
MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVICT HIM OF ATTEMPTED THEFT WHERE THE 
ONLY ISSUE FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE WAS "INTENT." 
• * ' i I, i • i . . . » , i • 1 . 1 . i i. 
Many cases throughout the land hold that there cannot 
be a conviction for an attempt unless there is intent to commit 
the crime and an ineffective act done toward its commission. See 
for example: People v. Buffrom, 256 P2d 317 page 321f People v. 
Werner, 105 P2d 927 page 931; People v. Lylesf 319 P2d 745 
page 747; State v. Crowel, 414 P2d 50 page 53; State v. Beremonf 
276 P2d 364 page 365; Ervin v. State, 351 P2d 401 page 405, Place 
v. State, 300 P2d 666; Vandiver v. State, 261 P2d 617. 
It may be argued that the adoption of §76-4-101 (3) (a) 
by the legislature rejected the widespread rule that there can be 
no conviction of an attempt if the act was in fact consumated, 
but even if it does, it does not abolish the requirement that 
there must be an intent to commit the offense in order to convict 
the appellant of an attempt to commit the offense. 
Lewis v. People, 235 P.2d 348, a Colorado case, deals 
with an almost identical principal. In that case, the charges 
submitted to the jury were that the defendant took indecent 
liberties (three counts) with a child under the age of 14 years 
and that he attempted to take indecent liberties with a child 
under the age of 14 years. The jury found the defendant not 
guilty of the three counts of taking indecent liberties with the 
child, but did find him guilty of attempting to take indecent 
liberties with the child. 
The Court, on page 350, asked the question: 
...where a verdict of not guilty is returned in 
connection with each count of the information 
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which charges the commission of the completed 
offense will a verdict of guilffy, returned by the 
jury upon a count charging an attempt to take 
immodest, improperf immoral and indecent 
liberties, be upheld? (Emphasis in original) 
The answer was in the negative. On page 351, the Court 
stated: 
...The evidence offered in support of the 
information, if believed, could only lead to the 
conclusion in the mind of a reasonable person that 
the indecent, immodest, or immoral liberty had 
been completely consummated. By the verdict of 
not guilty upon the first, second and third counts 
of the information the jury rejected the testimony 
offered by the people as being insufficient to 
establish the guilt off the defendant upon the 
only counts of the information which the evidence 
tended to prove. 
It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the 
trial court should be, and hereby is, reversed, 
and the cause remanded with directions to 
discharge the defendant. 
In the instant case, the jury, faced with admissions 
and stipulations of all of the elements of the offense except the 
element of intent or knowledge required by the statute to 
complete the offense, found the appellant not guilty of the crime 
of theft. To follow the logic and rationale of Lewis, then, the 
judgment of guilty of attempted theft should be reversed. 
In State v. O'Neil, 167 P.2d 471, the same concept is 
illustrated in another way. In that case, the defendant was 
charged with two counts. One count was an assault count and the 
second was a first-degree burglary count. Under the law of 
Washington where the case was decided, one of the elements of 
first-degree burglary is that there be an assault. Without the 
assault element, the offense is only second-degree burglary. 
The jury found the Defendant not guilty of assault, but 
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guilty of attempted first-degree burglary a lesser included 
offense of the first-degree burglary count. 
The court held that since the jury found the defendant 
not guilty of assault, and since assault was an essential element 
of the first-degree burglary charge, there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of guilty of attempted first-degree 
burglary. 
The court stated on page 474: 
The appellant's assertion is irrefutable that the 
verdict on the second count finding him guilty of 
an assault is inconsistent with the verdict 
returned on the first count which found him guilty 
of burglary in the second degree for the reason 
that section 460 of the Penal Code specifically 
classifies burglary accompanied by an assault on 
any person as burglary of the first degree. 
* * * 
Having found that the defendant was guilty of 
burglary of the second-degree, the necessary 
inference is that the jury must have assumed he 
made no assault. This verdict, in effect, 
constituted an acquittal of the first degree of 
burglary and the charge of an assault included 
therein. This determination that there was no 
actual assault is in irreconcilable conflict with 
the verdict on the second count of the effect that 
he was guilty of an assault, for both counts of 
the information were based on the same transaction 
which occurred at the same time and place. Since 
both counts are based on the same transaction and 
the finding of the jury on the first count refutes 
the possibility of the commission of the offense 
by means of an assault, the verdict on the second 
count is void and should be set aside. (Emphasis 
added) 
Appellant here submits that precisely the same 
principal and the same logic must apply. By its verdict of not 
guilty of theft, under the fact situation that exists in this 
case, the jury could only have concluded that the appellant did 
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not have the requisite intent or knowledge to commit a theft and 
since that same intent or knowledge is necessary for a conviction 
of attempted theft, as well as for theft itselfr there is not 
sufficient evidence to support the conviction of attempted theft. 
-IB Booth v. State, 398 P*2d 863, an Oklahoma case, in 
dealing with a situation involving attempting to receive money by 
false pretenses, the court noted: 
An accused cannot be convicted of an attempt to 
commit a crime unless he could have been convicted 
of the crime itself if his attempt had been 
successful. Where the act, if accomplished, would 
not constitute the crime intended, there is no 
indictable attempt. 
In this case, even though the act was completed, the 
act must be Coupled with intent, as required by Section 76-4-101, 
and there could be no such crime because the jury had already 
determined that appellant did not have the requisite intent or 
knowledge to commit the offense, hence the rationale of the 
Oklahoma Couirt in Booth, supra, is applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Ths appellant, KIP ROLAND PARKIN, respectfully submits 
that because of his acquittal by the jury of the crime of theft, 
there is insufficient evidence upon which to sustain the verdict 
of guilty of attempted theft and the verdict of guilty of 
attempted thQft should be reversed and^judgment of acquittal 
entered. 
Dated this j --" day of 
Ju' ftacArthur Wright ' J 
•Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
60 N. 300 E.f P.O. Box 339 
St. George, UT 84770 
Phone: 628-2612 
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